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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we examine the cofinancing of World Bank
projects with commercial banks in the context of the current
international debt crisis. After describing the institutions
involved, with particular emphasis on the World Bank, we
review the history of cofinancing with commercial banks. We
then describe the controversy that has existed between the
World Bank and commercial banks and present the World Bank's
proposal for resolving it. We take a critical look at what
commercial lenders and the World Bank perceive to be the
benefits of cofinancing, including its impact on the borrower
countries.
There are two critical factors that have contributed to
the development of the current debt crisis: the volatility of
debt repayment structures and the high incidence of
full-recourse lending. We evaluate cofinancing, as it has
been practiced and as it has recently been revised by the
World Bank, in light of these factors. We introduce possible
enhancements to the proposed cofinancing mechanisms, through
alternative financial instruments and project financing
arrangements. We then simulate the effect of four
hypothetical instruments: the standard commercial bank loan,
one of the World Bank's options, and two options we propose.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Donald R. Lessard
Title: Associate Professor of Management
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5INTRODUCTION
There is much concern currently about the international
debt situation. In fact, some describe it as in a state of
crisis. Many developing countries face debt service
obligations that they cannot currently meet. As a result,
commercial loans are being rescheduled and the international
lending community is in a frenzy.
This situation has arisen only in the last decade. Until
the 1970's, developing countries had only limited access to
funds from the developed world -- mainly through official
sources, such as governments and the World Bank. The first
oil price shock marked a sudden increase in bank lending to
developing countries from 1974 to 1975. The developed
economies were entering a period of slower growth, and,
consequently, their demand for imports declined. This decline
in demand was translated into a decrease in export earnings
for the developing countries, which, together with the higher
price of imported oil, resulted in their large current account
deficits. At the same time, commercial banks in the developed
economies were accumulating excess deposits as a result of
O.P.E.C. surplusses. The slowdown in the developed economies
brought a decreased demand for lending, and commercial banks
turned to the developing countries as potential customers.
The increased lending was followed by expansion in the
developing economies, which resulted in expanded markets for
the products of the developed economies.
The second oil price shock of the late 1970's has had
more severe consequences for the developing countries.
Whereas real interest rates in the 1970's had been very low,
at times even negative, both nominal and real interest rates
reached their highest point in 1979. This was a result of
tight monetary policies aimed at combating high inflation in
the developed countries. In addition, lending to developing
countries shifted to more short-term maturities, because
commercial lenders felt that this would decrease the risk of
their loans. Ironically, on an individual basis this might
have been the case. However, in the aggregate, this
shortening of maturities significantly increased the current
liquidity problem, thereby increasing the aggregate risk faced
by the banks. Countries, facing volatile short-term interest
rates and variable interest payments, required more frequent
refinancings of their loans. At the same time as their debt
was increasing and shifting to shorter maturities, the
recession in the developed countries, combined with the fallen
commodity prices, resulted in larger current account deficits
in the developing countries. This resulted in large increases
in debt-service ratios and, hence, in the current liquidity
crisis.
This growing debt burden is, in our opinion, the major
problem facing developing countries today. Two factors
contribute significantly to this dilemma: full-recourse
lending and volatile loan repayment structures. In essence,
much of what is considered "project financing" in the
developing countries is really full-recourse (and not
non-recourse) lending. Because commercial banks perceive high
levels of risk, they demand government guarantees on their
loans, thus converting project finance into full-recourse
lending. These loans then become part of the general debt
obligation of the country and increase its debt burden. In
addition, the repayment structures of these loans exacerbate
the problem in that they are sensitive to volatile interest
rates. Therefore, any attempt to alleviate the debt problem
must somehow address these two factors.
It seems logical that the solution to the debt problem
would lie with the commercial banks. Ideally, one would want
them to adjust their lending practices. However, in a case
such as this, it is impossible for one bank to take the
initiative and alter its lending policies. It is a gaming
situation in which the individual bank would find it difficult
to break away from the "herd" in order to pursue its
innovative policies. Thus, it would appear that a
collaborative mechanism must be found in order to facilitate
the solution process.
One form of cooperation, which has existed since 1975, is
the cofinancing of projects by commercial banks and the World
Bank. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or
not the current and proposed mechanisms for cofinancing
sufficiently address the debt problem in developing countries.
In essence, the cooperative action should provide greater
benefits to the parties involved than could be attained
through individual action. Through extensive interviews with
commercial bankers and World Bank staff, we have gained an
understanding of the perceived problems and benefits of
cofinancing. While several of these are real, many are
illusory. We will attempt to determine the extent to which
cofinancing methods actually address the issues of
full-recourse lending and the repayment structures, and,
ultimately, the debt problem in developing countries.
Chapter I describes the various institutions involved in
cofinancing, with particular emphasis on the World Bank. It
also includes a description of the project lending process of
the World Bank.
Chapter II describes cofinancing -- its original form and
its history.
Chapter III presents the three basic areas of contention
between the World Bank and the commercial banks when
considering cofinancing. We then discuss the proposed new
cofinancing instruments and the extent to which they address
the areas of contention.
Chapter IV examines the advantages and justifications for
cofinancing from the perspectives of the three parties
involved -- the borrower, the World Bank and the commercial
bank.
Chapter V contains an analysis of cofinancing with
respect to the issues of full-recourse lending and the
volatile repayment structures.
The Conclusion contains further thoughts on cofinancing,
as well as recommendations for the future.
CHAPTER I
INSTITUTIONS
In general, the term "cofinancing" refers to the
combining of funds from several sources external to a country
for the purpose of financing specific projects or programs in
that country. The World Bank perceives a need for cofinancing
because it never lends 100 percent of the funds necessary for
the financing of a given project, and the borrower country
cannot always fill the gap with counterpart funds. The
combined funds can be from several sources: official
entities, export credit institutions and private financial
institutions.
Official sources include governments and their agencies
and international multilateral institutions. Among the former
are agencies such as U.S.A.I.D. and its non-U.S.
counterparts in other countries that provide bilateral aid to
developing countries. Among the latter are multilateral aid
organizations, such as: the World Bank and its affiliates,
the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Group aid
organizations (U.N.E.S.C.O. and W.H.O.) and regional
development banks, such as the Inter-American Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development
Bank.
Export credit institutions include programs, such as the
United Kingdom's Export Credits Guarantee Department
(E.C.G.D.), France's foreign credit insurance program
administered by Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le
Commerce Exterieur (C.O.F.A.C.E.) and Germany's
Gerling-Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs - A.G. (G.K.S.)
and the Allgemeine Kreditversicherung A.G. These institutions
and others like them are usually supported, if not run, by
governments. Their common objective is to facilitate the
financing of activities that lead to the purchase of the
country's exports.
Private sources of funds include private financial
institutions, such as commercial banks, pension funds and
insurance companies. Commercial banks represent by far the
largest lenders to developing countries.
The focus of this thesis, as described in the
Introduction, is the cofinancing of projects in developing
countries where funds are combined from the World Bank and
commercial banks. Since the World Bank only lends for
projects that it has identified, prepared and appraised, the
projects will be referred to as World Bank projects. (This
should not imply, however, that such projects do not belong to
the countries in which they are undertaken. The expression
simply provides a convenient shorthand for this special
category of projects.) Hence, this thesis will examine the
cofinancing of World Bank projects by the World Bank and
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commercial banks.
Since a cofinancing arrangement requires some degree of
partnership between the World Bank and commercial banks, an
understanding of the World Bank is essential to a discussion
of cofinancing. The World Bank is an institution with
objectives unique to it and to only a few other multilateral
institutions. As such, it functions within a unique legal and
political framework that does not readily allow it to achieve
effortlessly a successful partnership with the commercial
banks. Commercial banks themselves have a set of policies
established so as to best achieve their objectives. For a
cofinancing mechanism to be effective, the World Bank will
have to "market" such a strategy in a way that is consistent
with the objectives and policies of commercial banks. In the
same way, commercial banks will need to better understand the
objectives and policies of the World Bank if some degree of
partnership is to be reached. The following section contains
an explanation of the World Bank -- its objectives,
procedures, and legal and political constraints.
The World Bank Group
The World Bank Group is composed of three institutions:
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(I.B.R.D.), the International Development Association (I.D.A.)
and the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.). The
common objective of I.B.R.D. and I.D.A. is:
"...to help raise standards of living in
developing countries by channeling
financial resources from developed
countries to the developed world."-[1]
Although I.B.R.D. and I.D.A. are legally and
financially distinct institutions, they are organizationally
integrated. Their operations are administered by a common
staff. Only the sources of funds and, consequently, the terms
of the lending differ according to the institution. This
distinction is very important, yet there is much confusion
centered around it. The press, the public and even commercial
bankers often do not appreciate the distinction between
I.B.R.D. and I.D.A.
The institutions differ both in their funding and lending
practices. The I.B.R.D. obtains most of its financial
resources by borrowing in the capital markets on commercial
terms. It then lends to its borrowers at a rate commensurate
with its own cost of funds. The average maturity for an
I.B.R.D. loan is twenty years and the interest rate is .5 to
1 percent over its cost of borrowing, as estimated for a
twelve-month period. The loan typically has a grace period on
the repayment of principal of about three years.
I.D.A.'s funds are not obtained on commercial terms. Its
capital comes from three sources: (1) transfers from the net
earnings of I.B.R.D.; (2) capital subscribed in convertible
currencies by its members; and (3) contributions from its
wealthier members. The replenishment of I.D.A.'s resources,
which is accomplished periodically, has become a hotly debated
issue in the United States Congress, and consequently, in the
press. It is here that the distinction between I.B.R.D. and
I.D.A. is not fully appreciated by the public. I.D.A. makes
"credits," as distinguished from the I.B.R.D. loans, on
concessional or "soft" terms to the poorest of the developing
member countries. These credits, which are for a term of
fifty years, are interest-free. There is, however, a service
fee charged to cover administrative costs, typically about one
percent. The grace period for the repayment of the credits is
ten years. Clearly, I.D.A. credits are intended to reach the
poorest of the developing countries. Countries must meet
several specific criteria to qualify for I.D.A. credits, one
of which is that they not exceed a per capita gross national
product maximum. Most countries that qualify for I.D.A.
credits receive a blend of I.D.A. credits and I.B.R.D.
loans, with the proportion of I.D.A. credits diminishing as
their economic conditions improve. Countries are eventually
"graduated" when they no longer meet the criteria. In the
public debate over the I.D.A. funds replenishment, the
general perception is that all "World Bank" lending is from
this contributed capital and, hence concessional. In fact,
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I.D.A. credits represent, only a fraction of total "World
Bank" (I.B.R.D. and I.D.A.) lending. In 1981, I.D.A. loans
comprised 28.4 percent of total World Bank lending.n[2]
The types of projects financed by I.D.A. are generally
not suitable for cofinancing with commercial banks. Most of
the countries that qualify for the credits are countries to
which commercial banks would not lend, or would lend at such
high rates that the countries could not afford to borrow.
Thus, this discussion of cofinancing with commercial banks
will apply only to loans for I.B.R.D. projects. However, it
should be noted that many I.B.R.D. projects are also not
suitable for cofinancing with commercial banks; thus, the
group of eligible I.B.R.D. projects is rather small.
The International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.) differs
from both I.B.R.D. and I.D.A. in that it lends strictly to
private sector institutions in developing countries. Its
objective is to encourage the growth of private enterprises in
these countries. The activities that I.F.C. finances are
generally well-suited for cofinancing with commercial banks.
In fact, I.F.C. regularly engages in such arrangements. The
focus of this thesis is, however, the cofinancing of I.B.R.D.
projects and, from hereon, all discussion, unless otherwise
indicated, will refer only to the cofinancing of these
projects.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(I.B.R.D.) was established in 1944 together with the
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) at the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. It is owned and controlled by its member
governments, all of whom must be members of the I.M.F.
The capitalization of I.B.R.D. is often misunderstood
and hence warrants some discussion. As mentioned above,
I.B.R.D. finances most of its lending operations by borrowing
in the international capital markets. Its debt capital
represents about seventy percent of its total capital.
I.B.R.D.'s borrowing policy is to diversify by country and
currency. It sells its securities by placing its notes and
bonds directly with its member governments, their agencies or
central banks, and by offering its issues to investors in the
private investment markets through investment banks, merchant
banks and commercial banks. Its bonds carry a "AAA" rating in
the United States and comparable ratings in other countries.
Historical borrowing costs have remained relatively stable.
This reflects a conservative liquidity policy that supports
the World Bank's effort to borrow in the capital markets when
rates and terms are favorable.
17
The equity capital of I.B.R.D. includes subscribed
capital and net accumulated earnings. The former represents
the largest component of the equity; it includes both
"callable capital" and "paid-in capital."-[3] Callable capital
represents most of I.B.R.D.'s subscribed capital (90 percent).
It is not actually paid by the members and may not be used in
the disbursement or administration of its operations.
According to the Articles of Agreement, the founding charter
that defines the legal framework within which I.B.R.D.
operates, this capital is to be called in the event the World
Bank becomes unable to meet any of its debt obligations. It
is, therefore, intended as a financial safeguard for its
bondholders. However, I.B.R.D.'s operating policies regarding
liquidity, diversification of borrowing, lending, and the
like, are as they would be without the existence of the
callable capital. Paid-in capital represents the remaining 10
percent of the subscribed capital. Unlike the callable
capital, it is actually paid by the members and is usable in
the institution's general operations.
I.B.R.D. does not bear the risk associated with foreign
exchange fluctuations. It holds the currencies of its
liquidity in the same proportion in which it borrows. It
disburses against loans in the basket of currencies that it
currently holds; it is repaid by the borrower in that same
basket and paid interest thereon. The basket of currencies in
which a given loan is repaid is continually redefined during
the disbursement and repayment periods as the exchange rates
of the currencies held shift. I.B.R.D. borrows, however, as
if it bore the foreign exchange risk, calculating the implicit
revaluation potential of a borrowed currency against the
interest rate differential of other major currencies.
I.B.R.D. lending is limited by its Articles of
Agreement. The total amount of outstanding and disbursed
loans cannot exceed 100 percent of the unimpaired subscribed
capital, reserves and surplus. It is important to note that
guarantees given count against this limitation. (This is as
it should be since the World Bank incurs the same risk through
a guarantee as if it had made the loan.) Its ratio of loans
to equity, as governed by its Articles of Agreement, contrasts
with that of a commercial bank, which is typically greater
than 15-to-1. Capital increases for I.B.R.D. can be approved
periodically by a special governing body, the Board of
Governors. The ratio of loans to equity, however, can only be
altered by an amendment to the Articles of Agreement.
The function of I.B.R.D. is to lend for activities that
contribute to economic growth and productivity in its
developing member countries. Certain basic rules, as stated
in the Articles of Agreement, govern its lending decisions.
All loans must have a government guarantee. All loans must be
for projects or, in special circumstances, programs that are
considered "productive." Since the I.B.R.D. must "pay due
regard to the prospects of repayment," [5] it is required to
lend only when it "can assure itself that necessary funds are
unavailable from other sources on reasonable terms."-[6]
Hence, I.B.R.D. loans are intended to supplement official and
private lending. Its decisions to lend (as distinguished from
not to lend) must be based on economic considerations. It is
interesting to note that since all loans have government
guarantees, the repayment of a specific loan does not hinge on
the success of the project, but, rather, on the overall
ability of the government to meet its debt obligations.
I.B.R.D. states that it lends to member governments,
public agencies and corporations, or private entities and
corporations. However, since it requires a government
guarantee, it in effect is only lending to governments,
although funds are channeled to the other entities.
The World Bank considers itself both a developmental and
financial institution. Accordingly, the projects selected for
financing are expected to meet criteria established by both
"sides" of the institution. Given the broad development
objectives of the World Bank, the loan approval process
differs considerably from that of commercial banks. Following
a request by a member country, the World Bank undertakes a
comprehensive study of the economy (the Country Economic
Report). It is here that the overall development objectives
are agreed upon by the World Bank and the government. This
document serves as a planning tool for World Bank lending in
that country, as well as an assessment of the country's
overall "creditworthiness." Projects for which it lends must
go through an elaborate process of evaluation prior to
approval. Thereafter, unlike commercial banks, the World Bank
continues its involvement throughout the implementation of the
project. The process that World Bank financed projects
undergo will be referred to, from hereon, as the project
cycle.
Project Cycle
The World Bank considers that it passes through six
distinct phases in the development of a project:
identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiations and board
presentation, supervision, and evaluation.-[7] From the
perspective of commercial banks, these phases can really be
condensed into two broader stages. The first comprises all
the steps, leading up through the appraisal of the project,
which result in the project analysis. The second comprises
all the steps thereafter which involve the close monitoring of
project implementation.
In the identification phase,-[8] the first phase of the
project cycle, the World Bank and government identify projects
they consider to be of high priority for the economic
development of the country. The projects that are identified
are seen as consistent with the sectoral objectives of the
country's development strategy. The general design of a
project is still so tentative at this stage that no analysis
can be done, but projects that are identified are considered
potentially viable.
Once a project has been identified, the World Bank makes
a commitment to the project and there begins a close
collaboration by the World Bank and the proposed borrowers:
the preparation phase.n[9] The extent and nature of the
collaboration vary greatly from project to project, depending
on the borrower's expertise and familiarity with the World
Bank techniques and procedures. During this phase, the
technical and institutional arrangements for the project are
made, and detailed feasibility studies are prepared.
The preparation phase then leads to project
appraisal,n[10] at which time the World Bank reviews all
aspects of the project and lays the foundation for the
subsequent steps in the project cycle. The project is
evaluated for the soundness of its technical design and
engineering, as well as for the appropriateness of the
technologies and standards used. It is also critically
examined in terms of its "institution building" capacity, that
is, the impact it is expected to have on the development of
the country's institutions. Probably the most important
aspect of this phase, from the point of view of the World
Bank, is the assessment of the economic impact of the project
on the development of the country. Finally, the financial
appraisal is undoubtedly the most directly relevant component
of the project analysis from the perspective of commercial
banks in that it ensures that there are sufficient funds to
carry out the project and that the project is financially
viable, ie. that it will generate cash flows sufficient for
it to meet its financial obligations.
The next phase, negotiations and board presentation,-[11]
marks the transition from the analysis to the implementation
of the project. During the negotiations, the World Bank and
the borrower attempt to reach agreements regarding the overall
financial objectives and institutional arrangements of the
projects. The agreements are then incorporated in the loan
documents as loan covenants, and the loan is presented to the
Board of Directors for approval. The World Bank maintains an
active role in the subsequent phases of the project cycle.
According to the Articles of Agreement, the World Bank is
required to:
"...make arrangements to ensure that the
proceeds of any loan are used only for the
purposes for which the loan was granted,
with due attention to considerations of
economy and efficiency without regard to
political or other non-economic influences
or considerations". 
-[12]
An important aspect of the supervision phase is ensuring
that procurement of goods and services financed under the loan
is carried out in accordance with the guidelines stated in the
loan agreements. In most cases, this is accomplished under
"international competitive bidding." This method ensures that
prospective bidders from all member countries and Switzerland
will have ample notification of a borrower's needs and an
opportunity to bid on the goods and works. At other times,
other procurement rules, such as local competitive bidding,
may be stated in the loan agreements. As part of the
supervision of a project, the World Bank assures itself that
the borrower has prepared the specifications and tender
documents, and has evaluated the bids in the appropriate
manner. Only then will it disburse against the contract.
Finally, the World Bank completes the project cycle with
ex post evaluations of the project. This allows the World
Bank to expand its experience base for further projects.
The World Bank lends for a wide variety of projects.
Most of its lending to date has been for agriculture and rural
development projects (21 percent), transportation (21 percent)
and power (21 percent). Of the sectors to which I.B.R.D.
lends, only a few are suitable for commercial bank lending.
Commercial banks are more likely to lend for projects in the
industry, energy, power and telecommunications sectors than in
the other sectors because such projects yield a higher
financial rate of return and are less risky for the borrower.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Background
As mentioned in Chapter I, the term "cofinancing" refers,
in general, to any arrangement whereby World Bank funds are
associated with funds from other sources for the purpose of
financing a project. Until recently, there were three general
forms of cofinancing: joint, parallel, and participations.
Under all three forms, the participating banks have equal
claim on the project outcome, ie. there are no subordinated
claims.
Under "joint financings," the World Bank and co-lenders
share, in agreed proportions, in the financing and
disbursements of the cofinanced component of the project.
Since funds are combined to finance the same component, all
procurement of goods and services must take place in
accordance with World Bank procurement rules, typically under
international competitive bidding.
In a "parallel financing," the World Bank and co-lenders
finance separate components of a given project. Thus, the
borrower enters into more than one loan agreement. In this
case, World Bank procurement policies apply only to those
goods and services procured for the World Bank component.
The sale of "participations" in a World Bank loan can
also be regarded as a form of cofinancing. However, it is
only considered as such if the arrangements for the sale have
been set before the loan is signed. Thus, selling
participations from the World Bank's portfolio of outstanding
loans is not considered cofinancing.
Of the cofinancing arrangements possible, commercial
banks become involved via parallel financings or
participations. A parallel financing offers the private
lender flexibility in that the parallel loan's terms need not
match the World Bank's terms. On the other hand,
participations are less popular because World Bank loans have
fixed-rates and longer maturities than commercial loans;
private lenders are forced to lock themselves into an
instrument which is probably commercially less attractive.
Therefore, the bulk of cofinancings with commercial banks have
been through parallel loans.
The mechanism for arranging a cofinancing on a parallel
basis is quite flexible and involves three parties: the
borrower and its guarantor, the commercial banks, and the
World Bank. If a borrower chooses to seek funds from private
lenders, it must take the initiative in approaching the
commercial banks. While the World Bank does not officially
participate in the borrower's choice of a private lender, it
does facilitate the process by alerting commercial banks to
cofinancing possibilities, as well as by advising the borrower
in cofinancing technicalities. However, the ultimate choice
rests with the borrower.
Under the parallel arrangement, the borrower negotiates
two separate loans. The World Bank loan is usually at a fixed
rate with an extended maturity. On the private side, the
borrower negotiates terms and conditions directly with the
commercial banks and chooses the lead bank in the syndicate.
These commercial deals tend to be close to standard
medium-term Euroloan deals and include the usual management,
commitment, and participation fees. They are priced at a
spread above LIBOR. Whether or not the commercial loan is
guaranteed is negotiated between the borrower and commercial
lenders. Thus, the borrower signs two separate loan
agreements: one with the World Bank, and one with the
commercial bank syndicate.
Although the World Bank and commercial banks have
separate loan agreements with the borrower, they can be
related in several ways. It is at this point that the World
Bank draws the distinction between formal and informal
arrangements. Often, the World Bank will act as billing agent
for the commercial banks, collecting the payments of
principal, interest and fees. In a typical formal
cofinancing, the World Bank and commercial banks also sign a
memorandum of agreement which describes the relationship
between them and provides for: (a) the exchange of relevant
information concerning the project and borrower, as approved
by the borrower; (b) the mutual consultation before taking
action as outlined in the loan agreements with the borrower;
and (c) the World Bank's role as billing agent, if applicable.
The World Bank and commercial banks are further
associated through cross-default clauses in their respective
loan agreements with the borrower. A standard World Bank loan
agreement contains a provision "giving the World Bank the
right to suspend disbursements on its loans if, for good
cause, the loan from the private bank is suspended or
cancelled, or if repayments are accelerated."-[l] Should the
private bank accelerate repayments because of default, the
World Bank also has the right to accelerate repayments on its
loan. The commercial bank's loan agreement contains a similar
clause. It is important to note that these cross-default
clauses are optional, and neither lender is obligated to take
action. The extent of these linkages between the World Bank
and the commercial banks varies from transaction to
transaction. In the case of an informal cofinancing, the
borrower would conclude separate loan agreements and there
would be no memorandum of agreement between the World Bank and
the commercial bank. However, the standard formal arrangement
seems to include some linkage between the World Bank and the
commercial banks.
History
Cofinancing through parallel loans with commercial banks
is still fairly new at the World Bank. Since 1974,
approximately 92 projects have been cofinanced overall, with
about 44 having formal arrangements with the World Bank (ie.
memoranda of agreement and optional cross-default clauses) and
the other 48 without formal arrangements (linkages). Among
the first parallel arrangements were two loans to Brazilian
steel companies in 1975: Companhia Siderurgica Paulista
(COSIPA) and Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN). Both loan
syndicates were led by Bank of America and the loans totalled
U.S.$50 million and U.S.$55 million respectively. The COSIPA
loan was for eight years at 1 7/8 percent above LIBOR with
three years grace on the principal repayment and the CSN loan
was for seven years at 2 percent over LIBOR with three years
grace on principal repayment. In both cases, the principal
was retired in equal installments after the grace period. Of
the 44 parallel loans with formal arrangements, signed between
1974 and 1982, 26 were for projects in Latin America and the
Caribbean, with eleven in Brazil alone.'[2]
As mentioned, not all I.B.R.D. projects are suitable for
cofinancing with the private sector. In general, commercial
banks prefer to lend to large, capital intensive industrial
projects which produce fairly reliable cash-flows within
several years. It is, therefore, no surprise that between
1973 and 1982, 28 of the 92 privately cofinanced projects (or
about 30.4 percent) were in the power sector and included
projects in Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, and Fiji (among
others). Other popular sectors included agriculture and rural
development (17 projects), industry (14 projects), and
transportation (9 projects). Within the agriculture sector,
cofinanced projects were geared more towards agro-industries
(eg. fertilizer production). The industry sector included
several steel projects, as well as iron-ore, nickel, and
aluminum; in the transportation sector both highway and
railroad projects were privately cofinanced. The remaining
sectors, such as education and urbanization, did not contain
projects which were particularly attractive to commercial
lenders. [3]
As stated above, between 1973 and 1982, there have been
44 private cofinancings involving formal arrangements with the
World Bank. Approximately 207 institutions have been involved
and the total cofinanced amount is about U.S.$2 billion. In a
tally based on the country of headquarters, 39 United States
institutions and 35 Japanese institutions have provided 22.5
percent and 29.8 percent of the cofinanced funds respectively.
The next most active participants were United Kingdom banks
with 8.2 percent of the volume and Canadian banks with 7.1
percent of the volume. The list of frequent agent banks
includes Bank of America N.T. and S.A., Chemical Bank, Bank
of Tokyo, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Lloyds Bank
International Limited, and Bank of Nova Scotia International
Limited. For the 44 projects with formally arranged
cofinancings, the syndicated loans have ranged from as little
as U.S.$5 million to as much as U.S.$200 million. The terms
of these loans have been varied, with 5 years the shortest and
17 years the longest term; however, the average term is about
9.5 years. The interest rates hover at one to two percent
above LIBOR, and grace periods on principal repayment, when
they have been granted, extend between one and eleven years,
with the average being about 4.2 years.
While the numbers would seem to imply a rather strong
emphasis, cofinancing has been actually only a small portion
of overall World Bank lending. The cumulative total World
Bank lending (I.B.R.D. and I.D.A.) as of June 1982 was
approximately U.S.$105.2 billion.'[4] In addition, about
U.S.$32.3 billion were raised through all forms of cofinancing
(official sources, export credits, and private sources), of
which U.S.$8.4 billion were from private sources. Thus, total
lending (World Bank plus cofinancing) was U.S.$137.5 billion;
cofinancing (all sources) accounted for 23 percent and private
sector cofinancing accounted for only 6.1 percent.
There are several reasons why the amount of private
cofinancing has been relatively small. Perhaps the greatest
constraint, especially from the World Bank's perspective, is
that there are relatively few projects which can stimulate
commercial banks' interest in cofinancing. In any given year,
roughly 200 projects are appraised and presented to the
Executive Directors for approval. Of these, about 170 involve
concessionary funding and 15 involve export credits. Only the
remaining 15 projects are attractive to commercial lenders.
It is possible that as countries continue to develop, the
project mix will shift, thereby increasing the number of
commercially attractive projects. However, for the present,
the number of these projects is small and places a limit on
the amount of private cofinancing possible.
Another possible reason for the low amount of private
cofinancing seems to rest with the mechanism itself. The
basic stance of the World Bank has been that the private
co-lenders should be involved in a separate loan to the
borrower. In essence, the two should remain "distant." This
is emphasized by the fact that the cross-default clauses, when
they exist, are only optional; the World Bank and commercial
lenders are not legally bound to support the other's action
should one of them declare a loan in default. Many commercial
banks feel this separation tends to make the cofinanced
project less attractive than if the World Bank were more
closely tied to them, and it limits the commercial banks'
involvement. This issue is discussed more fully in the next
section.
In general, cofinancing seems to be an attractive
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concept. However, it has not occurred frequently. This might
indicate that the current mechanisms do not adequately satisfy
the differing objectives of the World Bank and commercial
banks. The next chapter will present the different points of
view and describe the World Bank's proposed solution to this
controversy.
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CHAPTER III
CONTROVERSY AND PROPOSED NEW INSTRUMENTS
The Controversy
There are basically three areas of contention between the
World Bank and commercial banks when considering cofinancing:
the extent of World Bank participation, the cross-default
clause, and guarantees. Under the original cofinancing
mechanism, the commercial lenders (often through a syndicate)
and the World Bank signed separate loan agreements with the
borrower. Although both parties were involved in financing
the same project, commercial bankers felt that the World
Bank's presence alone did not really contribute to a reduction
in their risk exposure. After all, the World Bank maintained
a "preferred" status with the borrower, and commercial bankers
felt that their position had been subordinated to that of the
World Bank. Technically, their perception is accurate, for
the World Bank believes its role must transcend that of a
commercial creditor. In fact, in recent reschedulings, the
commercial bank portions of cofinanced projects in Ecuador and
Argentina were not protected, whereas the World Bank loans
were not rescheduled. Thus, commercial banks are now seeking
a closer relationship with the World Bank before entering into
cofinanced deals. Commercial bankers believe, however, that
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there is a certain reticence in the World Bank for it is felt
that a more formal relationship will "commercialize" the World
Bank and move it away from its broad development objective.
If this is the case, then the World Bank must weigh this
against the desirability of increasing commercial banks'
involvement in lending to developing countries.
The second point of contention concerns the cross-default
clause. Under the current cofinancing mechanism, the lenders
agree to an optional cross-default clause in the loan
agreement with the World Bank. By means of a cross-default
clause, the World Bank reserves the right to suspend
disbursements on its loans if, for good cause, the loan from
the commercial bank is suspended or cancelled, or if
repayments are accelerated. (The World Bank considers a
default as "good cause.") It also reserves the right to
accelerate repayment of its loan when a commercial bank loan
is accelerated following a default by the borrower. Since the
clause is optional, it does not, however, obligate the World
Bank to take these remedial actions, but only states that it
has the right to do so. Again, commercial bankers feel that
this does not offer enough protection to reduce their risk
exposure. In effect, the threat of default is lessened only
to the extent that a given government feels the World Bank
will take action if a loan is declared in default. Commercial
lenders are aware of the World Bank's special relationship
vis-a-vis member governments, and they are not convinced the
World Bank would come to their support when the situation had
deteriorated to the point of confrontation between commercial
banks and the government. On the other hand, the World Bank
does not want to put itself in the position of having to
respond in a specific fashion based on others' decisions. It
is quite aware of its special relationship with a government,
and it wants to maintain a certain flexibility of action.
Thus, the cross-default issue represents a gaming situation:
it reduces the commercial bank's risk only in that it poses
the possibility of World Bank action in response to a
country's default on a project.
The last point of discussion between the World Bank and
the commercial banks concerns the possibility of a World Bank
guarantee on the private portions of a cofinanced project.
While the World Bank requires a guarantee on its loans, a
guarantee is a negotiated item between the banks and the
borrowers in the commercial bank loan. In many cases,
commercial banks have received guarantees directly from the
government or indirectly via parastatal organizations.
However, these do not always carry the weight a commercial
banker would like. Therefore, commercial bankers are
requesting that the World Bank guarantee the private portion
of a cofinancing. From a legal standpoint, this poses a
problem for the World Bank. If it guarantees a loan, it must
carry that loan on its books as if it had actually signed it.
The amount of the guarantee is then counted against the
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lending limit for that country and against the total World
Bank lending target. Thus, the World Bank might as well have
lent directly for the project.
These three specific points were derived from the basic
issue of the World Bank-commercial bank relationship in
cofinancing: how close should it be? After lengthy
discussions with commercial banks, the World Bank has
developed a supplementary cofinancing mechanism to augment the
current system. It seeks to address the specific issues
raised by commercial banks and attempts to define a closer
relationship between the two.
Proposed New Instruments
In January 1983, the Executive Directors of the World
Bank approved management's proposal to establish a U.S.$500
million fund for the purpose of lending under the revised
cofinancing scheme. This fund will be drawn down over the
next two years in a pilot program with an expected average of
fifteen to twenty projects per year. Given an average World
Bank participation of 20 percent, it is hoped that the
alternate mechanism will result in total cofinancings of
approximately U.S.$2.5 billion over the two years.
The purpose of the new cofinancing instruments in
supplementing the present methods is to increase commercial
bank involvement. To this end, the new instruments are geared
toward involving the World Bank in a direct participation or
contingent obligation in a commercially syndicated loan. In
general, the structure of the overall cofinancing will be
similar to the current method. A given private cofinancing
arrangement will consist of two parallel loans: the first
from the I.B.R.D. and the second from the commercial lenders.
The difference is that the World Bank will either be a
participant in the syndicated second loan or will hold a
contingent obligation in the second loan. The World Bank loan
(or "A" loan) will be at standard I.B.R.D. terms; the
parallel loan (or "B" loan) will be at prevailing commercial
terms. Additional funds raised through these cofinancing
arrangements will be used to finance projects already
considered suitable for I.B.R.D. lending. The World Bank
hopes that its closer association with the commercial lenders
will improve "their perception of the quality and security of
cofinanced assets."-[1]
There are three new instruments: a direct financial
participation, a guarantee, and a contingent obligation.
While each is different, the three have a common goal. That
is, each option is supposed to encourage commercial banks to
grant longer maturities and grace periods than are normally
granted. In this way, a loan's repayment stream would better
match the borrower's capacity to repay. This is a problem
with the current cofinancing mechanism: the commercial
parallel loans in a cofinancing rarely have longer maturities
than non-cofinanced commercial loans. The new instruments
should solve that. They are described below.
i. Option I - Direct Financial Participation
Under this scheme, the World Bank would participate in
the later maturities of a commercial loan, thus extending the
maturities beyond the standard commercial limit. Initially,
the World Bank would take a 10 percent participation, but
would be willing to increase it to 25 percent, if necessary,
in the hope of extending maturities. As the loan matured, the
World Bank's share would increase proportionately, and it
therefore would retain the right to reduce its share through
the sale of its participations, thus remaining under the 25
percent ceiling.
ii. Option II - Guarantee
This instrument has two forms. In one case, the World
Bank would guarantee the later maturities (eg. the last four
years) of a commercial loan, thus providing the co-lenders
with the incentive to extend maturities. In the other case,
the World Bank would offer the co-lenders a put option on the
later maturities. When exercising this option, under the
conditions specified in the loan agreement, the World Bank
would purchase the designated maturities at the request of the
co-lender. Of course, in economic terms, these two forms of
this instrument are identical. The World Bank has priced the
guarantee at about 75 basis points, which reflects the
opportunity cost of its forgone investments. This is really
quite cheap when one considers that the World Bank is valuing
its investment opportunities at close to the risk-free rate,
while the project it would guarantee is much riskier. This
discrepancy is difficult to justify, given that it could
result in an adverse selection of projects because the
commercial banks would have less incentive to properly
evaluate new projects when they are receiving a grossly
undervalued option (guarantee). As was mentioned earlier, a
guarantee counts against the World Bank lending limits and
would correspondingly reduce its investment opportunities.
iii. Option III - Contingent Obligation after Level Payments
Under this scheme, the commercial lenders would extend a
variable interest rate loan with fixed payments, and the World
Bank would take a contingent participation in the final
maturity. The variable interest and principal payments would
be adjusted within a framework of a fixed nominal overall debt
service payment. Since it would be a variable interest loan,
the interest charges could change and the principal payments
would adjust so that the overall payment remained fixed. If
interest rates rose, the amortization would not be completed
according to the original schedule, and the World Bank would
accept the obligation to finance the unamortized balance at
the loan's maturity. Of course, the option would also exist
for the commercial lenders to agree to refinance this
outstanding principal balance.
Implications of New Instruments
The new instruments, in that they are a departure from
the original cofinancing mechanism, require a different
approach in their structuring. Whereas, under the original
system, the World Bank did not participate with the borrower
in choosing the co-lenders, its role will now be more active.
The borrower and the World Bank together will decide which
group of commercial banks will be approached. If preliminary
discussions are fruitful, the selected banks will be invited
to submit offers, which will be reviewed by both the World
Bank and the borrower. However, the mandate to organize and
negotiate the loan will be awarded by the borrower. Although
the World Bank would play a significant role in the cofinanced
loan, it does not wish to retain a controlling position.
Thus, the role of lead manager or agent bank will be awarded
to a co-lender.
This closer relationship between the World Bank and
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co-lenders entails other changes in the current cofinancing
procedures. The World Bank maintains strict control over
procurement and disbursements under its loans, and it only
disburses for approved purchases. The regulations would also
apply to the actual or contingent share of the cofinanced
loan. Also, the World Bank "would have to be satisfied that
the entire loan would be used for proper purposes in an
efficient and economical manner."'[2] Thus, co-lenders would
benefit from the additional attention paid to the use of their
funds.
The "B" loan would contain standard covenants governing
the relationships between commercial lenders and borrowers.
The World Bank would not include its broader sectoral or
developmental covenants which are standard in an I.B.R.D.
loan agreement. However, these covenants would be retained in
the parallel "A" loan agreement. Governing law could be
either English law or New York law, depending on the
co-lenders. The World Bank usually follows international law
and would have "to satisfy itself as to the acceptability of
any particular domestic law and national jurisdiction."'[3]
Another interesting point concerns the guarantee required by
the World Bank in its loans. In the case of a "B" loan, the
guarantee extended by the government would only apply to the
World Bank portion of the loan.
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By offering three new instruments, the World Bank is
attempting to respond to the commercial banks' criticisms of
cofinancing without compromising its own position vis-a-vis
the borrower and its government. In general, commercial banks
have commented favorably on the new instruments. However,
several issues still remain to be settled.
Although the World Bank is willing to participate
directly in a commercially syndicated loan, some commercial
bankers have questioned the extent of this willingness. As it
stands, in Option I (direct participation) the World Bank
participates only in the later maturities. Several commercial
bankers have wondered why the World Bank will not take a
straight pro-rata participation across all maturities, rather
than a discrete participation. In their opinion, a pro-rata
participation would signify a closer relationship between the
World Bank and commercial banks. From the World Bank's
perspective, a pro-rata participation would bring it too close
to the commercial banks, thus endangering its flexibility.
While the World Bank does wish to cooperate with the
commercial banks, given that its primary responsibility is to
the borrower, it feels it must retain a separate relationship.
Several commercial bankers, when commenting on the new
instruments, again raised the question concerning the
cross-default clauses and guarantees. The new instruments
will retain the standard optional cross-default clauses
between the World Bank and the co-lenders. The World Bank
still does not want to commit itself to taking an action
predicated on the actions of others. The World Bank also
continues to argue adamantly against the extension of a
blanket World Bank guarantee, which would cut into its lending
limits. This is certainly justified in that a guarantee
represents a real cost, based on the increased risk borne. In
effect, they feel commercial bankers are looking for means of
mitigating risk that they should probably be willing to
assume, given the returns they are demanding. If one were to
carry the issue further and allow the World Bank to guarantee
the commercial portion of the loan, then the commercial banks
should probably be lending at the risk-free rate. This being
the case, the World Bank could itself just as easily borrow in
the international capital markets at a low rate ('AAA' rated
by Moody's) and relend these funds. There would only be two
constraints to this option: (a) the Articles of Agreement
stipulate that the world Bank's capitalization be fixed
subject to the approval of the Board of Governors; and (b)
the World Bank's presence in the capital market is so large,
that it would find it difficult to borrow very frequently.
This example possibly extends the point to its extreme, but it
serves to illustrate that through a cofinancing, the World
Bank hopes to achieve goals other than merely increasing its
own lending volume.
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As of this time, there is little data to show whether
these new instruments will actually increase private
cofinancing with the World Bank. Although commercial bankers
have commented favorably, there is really no way of predicting
whether or not these supplementary mechanisms will be
successful. However, the question can be raised as to whether
or not these new instruments 
-- or cofinancing in general --
are actually beneficial to the three actors: the borrower,
the World Bank, and the commercial lenders.
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CHAPTER IV
PERCEIVED BENEFITS: A CRITIQUE
In any cofinancing arrangement, the three parties
involved (the borrower, World Bank and commercial lenders)
should derive some benefits. On one side, the commercial
lender hopes to reduce its risk exposure through an
association with the World Bank. The borrower could benefit
from improved terms, funds additionality, and access to the
capital markets. In the middle, the World Bank as facilitator
would gain additional leverage in structuring projects. In
addition to looking at the benefits of cofinancing to these
three actors, it is important to look at the benefits as they
bear on the system as a whole, ie. on society. In other
words, does cofinancing somehow alleviate the international
debt problem? If it can be shown that there is a net benefit
to society through some synergistic effect, then the
collaboration of the World Bank with commercial banks via
cofinancing is superior to the sum of their -individual
efforts.
The Borrower
There are four areas in which the borrower supposedly
benefits from undertaking a project funded through
cofinancing: additionality, greater access to commercial
lenders, better terms, and improved projects.
"Additionality" refers to the notion that an action (eg.
cofinancing) can broaden the capital base to which a
developing country has access for project financing. Implicit
in this definition is the assumption that the World Bank is
resource-constrained and that there are more projects than
there are resources to finance them. In order to show that
additionality is really achieved, one would need to prove that
a commercial bank would not have lent for the project were the
World Bank not involved or that it would lend more were the
World Bank involved. This could indicate that, by decreasing
the perceived risk to the commercial banks, the World Bank's
presence has increased the flow of funds to the borrower.
Although it is difficult to determine directly if
additionality has occurred, one can at least test some of the
underlying assumptions. In the last two fiscal years, the
World Bank has not even achieved its own lending targets.
This indicates that the resource constraint over this period
has not been binding. Hence, additionality could not have
been achieved. With respect to this criterion, the borrower
has not really benefitted from cofinancing.
Another stated benefit of cofinancing is that it
increases the borrower's access to the capital markets. From
a philosophical standpoint, one could argue that this is
necessary. As a country develops, it must move away from
concessional borrowing and enter the capital markets. Since
the World Bank exists to promote development, it should be
instrumental in this process. It is true that World
Bank-arranged cofinancing has involved many commercial banks
(approximately 207 between 1973 and 1982), but it would be
difficult to prove that these institutions would not otherwise
have financed projects in these countries. The countries in
which cofinancings have occurred are predominantly Latin
American countries where foreign commercial banks already had
experience (eg. Brazil, Argentina, etc.), and might well have
financed projects alone. However, recent projects have also
been financed in Thailand, India, and Liberia -- countries
possibly less familiar to commercial banks. Thus, it appears
that borrowers might be benefitting from cofinancing in this
respect. As an aside, the argument can also be made that a
commercial bank will lend for any project in a developing
country at the right price, and it does not need the World
Bank to facilitate this (or make such "introductions"). The
question remains, however: can the borrower afford to pay the
required price?
Perhaps the greatest envisioned benefit of cofinancing is
that it improves the terms of loans to developing countries,
including lower interest rates and longer maturities.
Together, these would lower the projects' contribution to the
country's debt service payments in any given year. In
essence, the commercial bankers would be willing to make
concessions if they felt that the World Bank's presence would
diminish risk and reduce the chance of default.
A meaningful comparison of terms under cofinancing versus
under regular financing is somewhat difficult to make.
Differences in project risk, even for the same borrower, would
be met with different terms. Also, the timing of the loans
and the corresponding market conditions would account for
different terms. However, in a select comparison, conducted
at the World Bank, of project terms versus terms obtained by
the same borrower, interesting results were obtained. For
example, the Republic of Ecuador borrowed U.S.$70 million in
June 1977 at 1.5 percent above LIBOR for seven years. In
March of the same year, the Autoridad Portuaria de Guayaquil,
with the government of Ecuador as guarantor, borrowed through
a cofinancing U.S.$10 million at 1.5 percent above LIBOR for
eight years. The other comparisons are similar. The results
have led World Bank officials to believe that cofinancing does
not necessarily improve the terms the borrower can negotiate.
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The last justification for cofinancing is that it
improves and expands the scope of projects that commercial
banks are willing to finance. Again, this is difficult either
to support or refute. However, if one considers the types of
projects that have been cofinanced so far, they appear to be
projects which commercial banks would have considered in any
case (industrial projects, etc.). It is not clear that
commercial banks would be interested in a standard I.B.R.D.
project because the aim of such a project is different from
that of a commercial project. It is normally a longer-term
project with cash-flows turning positive only after a
substantial lag. Furthermore, its goal is macro-economic
development, which will often lie outside the interest of the
commercial bank. Therefore, although an expansion of the
project base through private cofinancing would be desirable,
it does not appear to be possible.
Although the borrower should benefit from cofinancing
with the private sector, upon closer reflection it is not
clear that the stated benefits are actually obtained. It is
difficult to prove or disprove additionality, as well as the
greater access to capital markets, and it is not clear that
better terms (price and maturity) are negotiated, or that the
project base can be expanded through cofinancing.
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The World Bank
Given that the objective and raison d'etre of the World
Bank is the fostering of economic development for its
developing member countries, it should follow that the
benefits to the World Bank of cofinancing should be the same
as those of its borrowers. Hence, the above discussion of the
benefits to the borrower -- additionality, greater access to
commercial lenders, better terms and improved projects -- also
applies to the World Bank.
In addition, because World Bank lending is limited by its
Articles of Agreement, cofinancing offers it the possibility
of broader impact in affecting international development. As
was mentioned earlier, the World Bank has not met its lending
targets in the past few years, indicating that its resource
constraint is not currently binding. Recently, however, its
lending program stopped growing in real terms. This has even
been reflected in a contraction in the size of its staff. It
is likely, therefore, that the resource constraint will be
binding in the future. By providing access to expanded
sources of capital to finance the projects that it promotes,
cofinancing broadens the World Bank's impact on policy. As a
result, the World Bank can promote more projects and larger
projects. Moreover, it leaves more resources available for
nonproject lending, or structural adjustment lending, which
has a potentially broader impact on the macro-economic
54
policies of its borrowers. Finally, the increased capital
leaves more resources available for "typical" I.D.A./I.B.R.D.
projects that commercial banks would probably never be
interested in financing.
Commercial Lenders
For a discussion of cofinancing to be more than purely
academic, one must look at it in part from the perspective of
the commercial lenders. Given that there are benefits to be
derived by the borrower and the World Bank, the next step is
to examine what commercial bankers perceive to be the
advantages for them of entering into cofinancing arrangements.
To this end, we conducted interviews with commercial bankers
from several major banks that have been active in cofinancing
with the World Bank. The following description of the
advantages and disadvantages to commercial lenders stem from
these interviews.
Probably the most tangible advantages are derived from
the process through which World Bank-financed projects are
subjected. Because of its broad development objectives, the
World Bank directs a large amount of financial and staff
resources towards making and following up on its lending
decisions. The analysis that goes into a project appraised by
the World Bank is far more elaborate than in the case of a
commercial bank. As a result, a project that has reached the
World Bank's appraisal phase is likely to have had many of its
rough edges smoothed out. Moreover, the World Bank, due to
its official character, is privy to proprietary information.
All these factors can have a bearing on the potential success
of projects. The potential disadvantage to commercial banks
of this process is the time that it takes; yet, in our
discussions with commercial bankers, this did not seem to be
of great concern.
Commercial bankers stressed the usefulness of the World
Bank's involvement during the implementation phase of the
project, even more emphatically than in the analysis phase.
They felt that the World Bank was very effective in closely
monitoring project implementation through the reporting
requirements it imposes on the borrower and the periodic field
visits its staff make. This aspect of the World Bank's
involvement was found to aid in the effective and efficient
implementation of projects and to lend great strength to an
association with the World Bank. (This was the element that
one banker thought the World Bank should stress the most in
"marketing" cofinancing to the commercial banks.)
More important than the quality of the World Bank's
project analysis and role in implementation are the benefits
that are less tangible. These benefits relate to the
"political presence" of the World Bank and bear on the
possible lessening of risk in a project cofinanced with the
World Bank. As mentioned earlier, the projects that are
identified, and subsequently disbursed against by the World
Bank, are high priority projects. This, combined with the
World Bank's involvement, helps to ensure that they will be
allocated the resources and given the attention necessary for
their success. In past cofinancing arrangements, some loan
agreements between the commercial lenders and the borrower
have included cross-reference clauses. These clauses often
reflected commitments governing certain aspects of project
implementation that were stated in the covenants of the loan
agreement between the World Bank and the borrower. In our
discussions with commercial bankers, the cross-reference
clauses were not seen as important in the overall scheme since
the World Bank could be counted on to ensure that the
commitments were met.
Another advantage to an association with the World Bank
arises from the special status that the World Bank enjoys.
Not only does it receive a government guarantee for all of its
lending, but there has never been a default on a World Bank
loan. It could be that this special status may have a
positive effect on the commercial bank component of a
cofinanced project. On the other hand, it could also be that,
in the case of pending default, the World Bank component of
the cofinancing would be so likely to be repaid that the
commercial bank component might have a greater probability of
not being repaid. It should be noted, though, that in almost
every past cofinancing with the World Bank, commercial banks
have received government guarantees. This does seem to be a
benefit of an association with the World Bank.
An additional, though less important, benefit to
commercial banks of entering into a cofinancing is that one
bank must take the lead management role in a loan syndication,
and hence collect the associated fees.
Finally, a few commercial bankers raised the public
relations aspect of cooperating with an institution such as
the World Bank. The consensus was that this was only a minor
benefit, however.
One key element in assessing the appeal of cofinancing
arrangements to commercial banks is the cross-default clause
in the loan agreement between the World Bank and the borrower.
Since under the optional cross-default clause, the World Bank
is not obligated to take remedial actions, but only has the
right to do so, the consensus of the commercial bankers
interviewed was that the clause, as stated, was worthless.
Society
When looking at cofinancing from the standpoint of
society, the perceived benefits to the borrower, World Bank
and commercial banks, may not in fact be benefits at all.
Under the proposed cofinancing structure, all of the benefits
described above have costs associated with them. Some of
these costs are incurred by the same party deriving the
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benefit. The questionable existence of additionality is the
best example. It remains uncertain whether cofinancing indeed
expands the capital base to which a country has access for its
investments or if it simply replaces commercial lending.
Other costs that offset benefits of one party may be
incurred by another party. This occurs in the case of the
guarantee that the World Bank offers under Option II or as
implicit in the cross-default clause (if it were obligatory).
Upon first observation, such a guarantee could be viewed as a
net transfer from the World Bank to the commercial banks. As
such, it would be neither good nor bad in that commercial bank
lending would simply replace World Bank lending for the same
types of projects as before. However, there is an additional
cost associated with a World Bank guarantee to the commercial
lenders. Since the World Bank requires a government guarantee
from its borrower, its guarantee to the commercial lenders
ensures that the government will also guarantee the obligation
to the commercial lender. In essence, cofinancing, where
there is some form of guarantee by the World Bank, contributes
to replacing non-recourse lending with full-recourse lending.
This results in a larger general debt obligation and
exacerbates, rather than alleviates, the current international
debt problem. In fact, given that commercial banks have
enjoyed a government guarantee under almost every cofinancing
to date, the net effect may actually represent a cost to
society. The next chapter will elaborate on this and identify
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what are really the important issues to be addressed and how a
net benefit to society might be achieved.
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CHAPTER V
EVALUATION OF COFINANCING
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the
effectiveness of cofinancing in alleviating the international
debt problem as presented in the Introduction, namely the
difficulty of developing countries in meeting their debt
service obligations. The description of the problem will
first be elaborated, with a discussion of factors that
contribute to it. Then, an evaluation of how cofinancing
addresses (or could address, were it altered somehow) these
important factors will follow. Finally, we conclude the
chapter with a simulation of several alternative cofinancing
instruments.
There are two major factors that have contributed to the
problem that developing countries currently face. The first,
the high volatility of debt repayment structures, has made it
difficult for these countries to manage their debt and has
drained their foreign exchange reserves. The second factor,
the high incidence of lending with full recourse to the
borrower country, has unnecessarily added to the general debt
burden of the countries. This has arisen because of the
full-recourse nature of project financing in developing
countries.
The Debt Repayment Problem
Western banks are finding themselves increasingly exposed
in the developing world. The developing countries and Eastern
Europe together owe about U.S.$420 billion, of which U.S.$135
billion is owed American banks.n[l] The nine largest U.S.
banks have about 220 percent of their capital on the line in
developing countries experiencing repayment problems. For
example, Citibank has loans in Brazil totalling about 80
percent of shareholders' equity, and Chemical Bank has about
77 percent of its total equity exposed in loans to Mexico."[2]
It is no wonder that commercial bankers are concerned.
Commensurate with the commercial banks' increased
exposure is the growth in the developing country debt problem.
The flow of private medium- and long-term loans (net
disbursements) for all developing countries grew from U.S.$5
billion in 1970 to U.S.$56 billion (current dollars) in 1982
-- a rate of 22.3 percent per annum. Debt service payments on
private and official debt, which were U.S.$71.3 billion in
1979, rose to about U.S.$119.0 billion in 1982. Interest
payments comprised about U.S.$25.3 billion in 1979, rising to
about U.S.$56.0 billion in 1982 -- a 30 percent increase per
annum.-[3] While debt as a percent of exports of goods and
services remained somewhat constant throughout the period
1978-1982, the debt service ratios (debt service payments as a
percent of exports of goods and services) increased.-[4] This
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can be explained by the increasing nominal and real interest
rates on the outstanding debt which raised interest payments.
There has also been a marked shift by developing countries
away from official lenders (fixed or concessional terms) to
private lenders (variable terms) in the last few years; this
has also increased the debt service requirements.
The increasing nominal and real interest rates -- results
of high inflation in the developed countries -- have forced
many countries into a liquidity crunch. Standard commercial
loans carry variable interest rates which are tied by a spread
to LIBOR. As inflation increases, LIBOR tends to move
upwards, and the interest payable on a loan in a given period
increases. "The average rate on floating interest debt
including estimated spread and fees, rose from 8 percent for
1972 to 18 percent for 1981."-[5] This, in turn, increased the
total debt service due in that period, and created a greater
drain on the countries' foreign exchange. Currently, nearly
80 percent of developing country foreign exchange is required
to service debt.-[6]
Much of the current liquidity crunch can be directly
attributed to the lending mechanisms of the developed country
banks. It is standard banking policy to match assets to
liabilities. In other words, the terms on the loans a bank
extends should resemble the terms on its deposits or
borrowings. During periods of steady inflation, the nominal
interest rate incorporates expectations of inflation, and
banks are willing to lend at fixed rates for extended
maturities. However, during periods of unexpectedly high
inflation, the value of a fixed rate loan erodes in real
terms, and the banks face a loss. At the same time, on the
liability side, banks are required to pay higher rates on
deposits and for borrowings.
During the 1970's, inflation increased rapidly worldwide;
banks reacted by taking actions to protect both sides of their
balance sheets. On the asset side, they began to extend
variable rate loans in order to protect themselves from asset
erosion in real terms. On the liability side, they borrowed
short-term funds at market rates, which in turn required that
their own loans be of a shorter maturity. The net result was
that the borrower bore the interest risk and faced
shorter-term loans and higher interest payments. Under normal
circumstances, this might not have posed a great problem.
However, coupled with the high inflation came a drop in
commodity prices, and the developing countries now face a
general drop in export earnings. The growth of merchandise
exports in the developing countries, which had averaged 5.1
percent per annum over the period 1970-1978, has begun to
decline: drops of 4 percent in 1980 and 2.3 percent in
1981.-[7] As a result of the lost export earnings, the
developing countries now face a shortage of foreign exchange
necessary for repaying the outstanding loans.
While the prognosis for the future is not necessarily
bright, there exists the strong possibility that the
developing countries, working together with the commercial
banks and the I.M.F., will be able to affect remedial measures
for the short-term. However, unless the structure of the
standard lending mechanisms employed by the commercial banks
is changed, the developing countries will continue to fence
with these debt servicing problems. Thus, long-term solutions
must be sought through adjustments in both the risk
compensation commercial banks require and the repayment
structures their loans impose.
Project Finance as Full-Recourse Lending
Of primary concern to all three actors in an
international project financing is the issue of risk and the
extent to which it can either be shared, shifted or decreased.
The borrower is concerned with the various types of risk that
it faces throughout the development and commercialization of
the project. The commercial lender is ultimately concerned
with the risk of default on the project loan. In the case of
loans for project financings in developing countries, this
issue increases in importance because of the "country risk"
component of default risk. Because of the special nature of
project finance in developing countries, the government faces
the additional concern of its loan's effect on the country's
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overall debt obligation. The purpose of this chapter is to
determine if the World Bank, through its proposed cofinancing
scheme has succeeded in meeting the above-mentioned concerns.
The investor in a World Bank-financed project is the
government or entity that borrows from the World Bank. In
making the decision to invest, the investor must assess the
value of the project. Modern international finance provides a
framework within which to make decisions regarding the
allocation of resources among alternative investment
opportunities. Central to valuing a project is the assessment
of risk or uncertainty associated with the project.
The investor faces several types of risk in the
development, commercialization and financing of a project:
(i) investment risk; (ii) currency risk; and (iii) financial
risk. These components will be referred to as "project risk."
(i) Investment risk encompasses the uncertainty
associated with the variability of project costs and
revenues.-[8] For either physical or market related
reasons, costs, which include both capital and
operating costs, can vary, hence affecting the
profitability of a project. For example, a project
can experience cost overruns due to market
fluctuations in the price of inputs. The stream of
revenues generated by a project is also subject to
variability due to market related considerations,
such as price and demand. For example, the revenues
from a mineral extraction project depend on the
export price for that commodity.
(ii) Currency or foreign exchange risk relates to
the vulnerability of a project to fluctuations in
foreign exchange rates. There are two kinds of
exposure to this kind of risk: financial and real.
Financial exposure is the exposure that can be
hedged via financial transactions. As such, it is
not of much concern. Real exposure involves the
extent to which project revenues and costs are
denominated in different currencies; hence, it is
of concern to the investor.
(iii) Financial risk is that element of risk that
results from borrowing in the international capital
markets. The combination of a money-fixed
contractual obligation with uncertain cash flows has
the effect of increasing the risk associated with
the project itself.-[9]
The commercial lender must also assess the risk
associated with the decision to lend for a given project in a
given country. Ultimately, it is concerned with the risk of
default on the repayment of the loan. This risk entails both
project and political risk. The project risk that concerns
commercial lenders involves the uncertainty surrounding the
ability of the project to generate sufficient cash flows to
meet the borrower's debt obligations. It includes the risk
that the project will not be completed due to excessive
costoverruns or to raw materials not being as readily
available as planned, and the risk that production will not
occur as planned, and that market prices of demand for the
item or commodity produced will fall short of expectations.
Political risk encompasses a variety of environmental or
political events that can affect the repayment of a loan,
ranging from changes in foreign exchange controls and tax laws
to coups d'etats and wars. Project and political risks
clearly overlap in that there are many "political" events or
actions that can have an impact on the cash flows generated by
a project. When commercial banks make decisions to lend for
projects, they are concerned with these risks and their effect
on project cash flows.
They are also concerned, however, with another dimension
of risk that is not directly associated with the ability of
the project cash flows to cover debt obligations. This
so-called "country risk" relates to the ability or willingness
of the borrower country to meet its debt obligations. This
ability or willingness depends not on the sufficient
generation of project cash flows but on the aggregate debt
obligation of the country, even when financing specific
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projects.
In principle, project finance is non-recourse financing;
that is, the repayment of the debt associated with the project
should depend on the cash flows generated by the project.
This is typically the case for projects financed in developed
countries. In developing countries, however, it is not clear
that project finance is truly project finance. Many of the
projects in developing countries that are financed in part by
commercial banks are run by state or parastatal entities.
Their close relationship to the government is due in part to
the important national impact that they tend to have. For
example, large mineral extraction projects play a major role
in the development of a country. Because of the government's
close association with these types of projects, it sometimes
grants sovereign guarantees to commercial lenders. For
projects cofinanced by the World Bank and commercial banks,
the governments have almost consistently granted a guarantee
to the commercial lenders.
Even when a government does not explicitly guarantee the
repayment of a loan for a project, it effectively treats the
loan as if it were not project-specific. Hence, it is not
truly project finance, ie. non-recourse financing. Project
debt obligations effectively become part of the general debt
obligation of a country. Hence, when lending for projects in
developing countries, commercial banks are not really bearing
project-related risk (project risk and political risk that
affects the project cash flows) but country risk. It follows
then, that if, ex post, a project in a developing country does
not generate cash flows sufficient to meet its debt service
payments, the loan may still be repaid because the government,
which considers a project loan as part of its national debt
obligation, is likely to meet the obligation. This is not to
say that project-related risk should be ignored by commercial
lenders, since the success or failure of a project is likely
to have an impact on the country's overall ability to meet its
debt obligation. This is particularly the case in developing
countries where the investments for these projects represent a
large proportion of national income and the foreign exchange
that the export revenues from the project are expected to
generate are an important factor in the ability of a country
to meet its debt obligations.
The treatment of project finance as lending with recourse
to the country of the borrower has important implications for
the commercial lender, the borrower and the country. The
commercial lender is effectively lending to a country and is
bearing not the risk of the project itself but of the country.
The risk it bears that is project-related is really political
risk, as it potentially affects project cash flows. Moreover,
it bears the risk associated with the debt repayment capacity
of the country. Indeed, country risk is the aspect that makes
the commercial bankers "uneasy" about lending for projects in
developing countries. This is understandable since the events
that comprise country risk are totally out of their control.
The borrower, which shares the interests of the country,
actually bears the project risk since this risk is shifted to
the country as the project debt becomes part of the general
debt ogligation. This is a burden for the country in two
ways. First, a developing country is less able than a
commercial bank to diversify away the unsystematic risk of an
investment; hence, it unnecessarily bears such risk. Second,
the loan exacerbates the country's debt burden; this could be
avoided were the project loan truly tied to the profitability
of a project. In this way, full-recourse lending can make the
country worse off.
World Bank Role
The World Bank, in its intermediary role between the
developing countries and the commercial lenders, is in a good
position to take the lead in investigating new mechanisms for
cofinancing that address both the volatile loan repayment
structures and the high incidence of full-recourse lending.
As was mentioned earlier, any solution to the current debt
problem proposed by the I.M.F. and commercial banks will only
have a short-term effect. The long-term solution lies in the
restructuring of project lending to developing countries.
With respect to the problem of full-recourse lending, an
alternative to the existing effective project finance
mechanism would be appropriate if it resulted in a situation
where either both the lender and the borrower were better off
or if either the lender or borrower were better off without
the other being worse off.
One such alternative would be the establishment of an
escrow account into which a predetermined proportion of the
cash flows from a project would be periodically directed. The
account would be located outside of the country of the
borrower. The commercial lender would have access to the
account for the purpose of collecting the scheduled loan
repayments. A minimum balance would be maintained to ensure
that repayments could be made even at times when project cash
flows were not sufficient. This process would be continued
until the loan was repaid. Such a mechanism would bring
project financing much closer to non-recourse lending.
The legal issues surrounding this kind of arrangement
pose a problem. The central problem becomes: how can a legal
arrangement be arrived at where the government cannot
"expropriate" or claim sovereign right to the cash flows from
a project in its sovereign territory? This is a problem of
international law, and it is not the object of this thesis to
solve it. It suffices to state that there is currently no
clear solution since sovereign right can ultimately override
contracts that are entered into. Hence, a borrower, in the
interests of its government, since the two are so closely
linked here, will terminate a contract when it determines that
its costs of continuing to honor it exceed the costs of
terminating it.
Perhaps the World Bank could play a part in the
enforceability of such an arrangement. We do not mean to
propose that the World Bank should guarantee that portion of
the debt of the project. When commercial banks lend for
projects, they should bear the risk associated with the
project. After all, they are charging a price to the borrower
for bearing this risk. Moreover, this is what true project
finance should entail. In its special role, the World Bank
could, as an alternative to the controversial cross-default
clause, play an intermediary role. For instance, it could
agree to intervene in a case of nonrepayment by the borrower
to commercial banks due to specific actions that it would
define specifically as "political." Such intervention could
ultimately involve calling in its portion of the loan or
participation.
This is more complex than it seems for several reasons.
First, there is a large gray area between what is defined as
"political" risk and "project" risk. For example, tariffs can
be imposed by a government, which adversely affect the project
cash flows. Similarly, tax laws can be changed which have a
similar effect. Such actions may or may not be intended to
effect the project. However, through their effect on project
cash flows, they can affect loan repayment. Thus, it would be
difficult to clearly delineate the responsibilities of each
party in a legal agreement. Second, the World Bank is legally
required to call in all of its loans in a borrower country if
it is forced to call in any one loan. Hence, it is unlikely
to agree to any clause that would bring it closer to taking
such serious action, particularly since it would have to do so
based on events out of its direct control. This solution is
unlikely to be acceptable to the World Bank.
This alternative form of structuring project financings
-- using escrow accounts -- has been used by some commercial
banks, particularly in Mexico. However, it has been done on a
limited and ad hoc basis. It is limited, though, in the
recourse it provides the commercial banks to the borrower.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the nature of project finance
will change, ie. that the repayment of loans will be directly
linked to the success or failure of projects.
Since it might prove difficult to create project
financing mechanisms that are tied only to project success,
thereby eliminating the contribution of project lending to the
developing countries' debt burden, attention should be
directed to redesigning the loan themselves so that the
repayment schedules are less volatile. As a large lender with
an interest in the economic development of its borrowers, the
World Bank could take the initiative in proposing innovative
financial instruments that would mitigate the burden faced by
its borrowers. Ideally, these instruments would insulate the
borrower from the effects of inflation in the developed
countries, and, concurrently, provide the lender with a fair
return. They should be longer-term instruments, for projects
in developing countries have longer lags before cash flows can
begin to cover debt service payments. Also, the repayment
schedules should more closely match the countries' income
potential. The net result would be to lower the general debt
obligations of developing countries.
The original World Bank cofinancing mechanism has
involved parallel loans extended by private lenders at
standard commercial terms and variable rates. As was
mentioned, it is primarily the variable rate that has caused
debt service problems in the last few years. Inflation
affects variable rate loans by shortening the loan's average
life: the debt is amortized more quickly in real terms, and
this causes an increased financial burden. Also, inflation
affects the payment-to-income ratio implicit in the repayment
structure. Since, in real terms, the periodic payments will
decrease, a country is bearing a greater burden in the early
periods of the loan. If this "tilt" were removed somehow, the
real payments would more closely match a country's real
income, and the payment-to-income ratio would remain constant
in real terms, rather than decreasing.
All of the three alternative instruments proposed by the
World Bank have variable interest rates. Although Options I
and II (direct participation and the guarantee) seek to extend
maturities, they do little to affect favorably the debt
service of the borrowing country. However, Option III (the
contingent liability) takes direct action at reducing annual
debt service payments by incorporating a fixed payment with
flexible maturities. The argument for this instrument is
that, unlike with previous loan structures, a borrower (or
government) can plan better, because the annual payments are
known. However, there still are drawbacks. First, the
interest rate can still vary greatly and the payments would
have to be designed to ensure that they cover interest costs
in any given period, since no provision is made for this in
the loan itself. Second, increasing rates will extend the
maturities. Thus, the borrower will be tied in to this loan
for an unknown length of time. This fixed rate flexible
maturity instrument will allow the lender still to match
borrowing to lending because a short-term market rate could be
used, but the period of principal amortization would still be
unknown. With widely fluctuating interest rates, the fixed
nominal payment loan could become infinite.
Overall, Option III is an improvement over current
financing instruments. However, it still does not resolve the
basic question of which interest rate is preferable. The
borrower faces a long-term commitment and would naturally
prefer a long-term rate that is less volatile. On the other
hand, the lender relies on short-term funding which is tied to
the short-term market rate. Thus, although Option III
insulates the borrower from some of the variability of LIBOR,
it does not match debt service to the income stream. Lessard
and Modigliani, when looking at mortgages, proposed several
options for dealing with this issue. Two of these might well
be applicable to long-term development lending: the Dual-Rate
Variable Rate Loan (VRL) and the Constant-Payment-Factor
VRL. - [10]
The Dual-Rate VRL addresses the interest issue by using
two interest rates. A short-term rate or deposit rate would
be used as the debiting rate for computing the periodic
interest on the outstanding balance. A longer-term rate or
"payment factor" would be used to compute the periodic payment
which "is recomputed at fixed intervals by applying to the
principal then outstanding the standard annuity formula using
some longer-term rate."
This loan structure has several advantages. First, the
lender receives interest calculated at a rate closer to that
paid for funds. Second, the borrower makes periodic payments
at a long-term rate which better matches the project being
financed. Also, the longer-term rate would tend to protect
the borrower from the immediate impact of higher interest
rates. Since the amortization is periodically recalculated
using a long-term rate which incorporates short-term inflation
expectations, payments would increase during periods of
growing inflation. However, this payment increase would be
smoother than under a standard variable rate loan during high
inflation. Under this method, the maturity is fixed, and
lenders would know exactly when the loan would be fully
amortized.
A hybrid variation of the Dual-Rate VRL is the
Constant-Payment-Factor VRL. Again, it employs two rates: a
debiting rate tied to market conditions for the lender, and a
payment rate tied to the real interest rate. Under this
mechanism, the payment rate is contracted (kept constant), but
payments are recalculated on a regular basis. During
inflationary periods, it could be expected that the debiting
rate would exceed the payment rate by the amount of inflation.
An interest payment could conceivably be higher than the total
payment in a period of high inflation, but the excess would be
added to the principal outstanding, and the next period's
payment calculation would incorporate this. The net result of
this is that the borrower is better protected from inflation
because payments will increase approximately with inflation
over time; in real terms, the payments remain constant.
Simulation of Four Instruments
In order to examine the effectiveness of each of the loan
structures in spreading out the payments, we constructed
several hypothetical loans which are presented in Tables A-D.
Table A presents the standard commercial variable rate
loan of which the bulk of current developing country debt is
comprised. It is a twelve-year loan for $120 million with the
interest rate tied to LIBOR. In order to track interest rates
more effectively, the loan is presented from an historical
perspective: it begins in 1972 and is fully repaid in 1983.
By taking the ex post approach, it is possible to use the
actual interest rates in calculating the payments. The
six-month Eurodollar deposit rates (London) from December of
each year are used to approximate LIBOR, and a one-percent
spread has been added. The principal is amortized in equal
installments over the life of the loan. As can be seen, the
debt service payments fluctuate rather widely in nominal terms
over the loan's life, from a high of $22.2 million to a low of
$10.99 million. In real terms, the earlier payments are quite
high, and would have a great impact on a country's overall
debt service. However, they decline rapidly, thus
demonstrating the "tilt" in the repayment structure of this
instrument. If a borrower had assumed a similarly structured
loan in 1978, the debt service payments would have been quite
high: $25.96 in 1978, $26.94 in 1979, and $27.40 in 1980.
From 1980 on, they would have declined. It is clear that this
instrument is not beneficial to the borrower.
A version of the World Bank's new contingent liability
instrument is presented in Table B. The loan again assumes
$120 million for 12 years at a variable interest rate (LIBOR).
In this case, the total payments are fixed, and interest and
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amortization are adjusted. While the fixed payment is
supposed to be a benefit to the borrower, it also poses a
problem. As can be seen, the high rates of interest have
extended the maturities such that in 1983, $37.44 million is
left to be amortized. Supposedly, either the World Bank or
the original commercial lenders would refinance this.
Of course, the degree to which maturities are extended
depends on the level of the fixed payment. The $16.00 million
fixed payment was calculated using the annuity formula and
assuming an average interest rate of 8 percent for the twelve
years. Of course, with hindsight it is clear that the assumed
interest rate was too low. The average rate over the period
was 11.16 percent. This implies that the level payments would
have to be about $18.65 million in order for the loan to be
fully amortized over twelve years.
Although this loan offers level payments in nominal
terms, they are declining in real terms, and the borrower's
payment-to-income ratio will also decline. This "tilt",
coupled with the maturity problem, does not make this loan
structure a perfect alternative.
Table C presents a version of the Dual-Rate Variable Rate
Loan ($120 million for 12 years). In this case, two interest
rates are used: the debiting rate, which is the same as the
LIBOR rate used in the previous examples, and the payment
factor, which is a longer-term rate. In this case it is the
United States domestic government bond yield (long-term) in
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December of each year. As shown in the table, the use of a
longer-term rate somewhat reduces the fluctuation in the
stream of debt service payments. Here, the range is between
approximately $14.3 million and $22.6 million. Under this
arrangement, the lender still benefits by being able to charge
interest at a short-term rate, thus matching funding costs.
Concurrently, the borrower repays at a smoother rate, with
nominal payments being slightly lower in the early years and
then rising over time. While this instrument is an
improvement, it still "tilts." The borrower faces a
decreasing payment-to-income ratio since the debt service
payments are decreasing in real terms over the period of the
loan.
The last instrument we examined is the Constant-Payment-
Factor VRL presented in Table D. As in the Dual-rate VRL, two
interest rates are used. While the debiting rate remains the
LIBOR rate, the payment factor is the assumed real rate of
interest. For the purposes of this analysis, a rate of three
percent was chosen, and it was held constant throughout the
life of the loan. As can be seen, the debt service payments
start out quite low and increase fairly steadily over the
loan's life (from $12.06 million to $39.71 million). The
primary benefit of this structuring is that the borrower faces
a stream of payments that grows at the rate of inflation (ie.
the difference between the debiting rate and the payment
factor), thus remaining fairly constant in real terms at an
average of $9.55 million. On the other hand, the lender still
benefits from receiving interest based on short-term rates.
However, there is one drawback: the payments between 1981 and
1983 grow at a rate faster than the implicit inflation rate.
This probably occurs because there was a turnaround in the
inflationary trend in 1981 and because the loan has a fairly
short maturity. Moreover, real interest rates increased
during this period. If it had a 15- or 20-year maturity, this
variation would probably be reduced.
These four instruments are just a small sample of
creative financial structurings possible for dealing with the
debt burden of the developing countries. All of them address
the issue of the lender's ability to match funding costs with
loans, and three of them address (to some degree) the problem
of the borrower's ability to bear the financial burden imposed
by these loan structures (the standard variable rate loan does
not). The preferability or suitability of one instrument
versus the other two probably reduces to a question of
implementation. From an institutional standpoint, it is
perhaps easier to syndicate a loan along the lines of a
contingent liability (fixed payments, flexible maturity) than
under the other two alternatives. However, perhaps this is
where the World Bank could enter the picture. As a
coordinator and facilitator, it might be in a better position
to implement an innovative form of lending to the developing
countries.
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Given the results of the evaluation, the following
section concludes the thesis with the highlights of the
analysis and some comments regarding the future of cofinancing
or of some hybrid thereof.
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TABLE A
STANDARD VARIABLE RATE LOAN
YEARS INT. PRINCIPAL
RATE AT BEG.OF
PERIOD
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
7.2
11.1
11.2
7.3
6.4
8.5
13.3
15.4
17.4
15.8
10.4
9.9
120.00
110.00
100.00
90.00
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
--------- PAYMENTS---------
INT.
8.64
12.21
11.20
6.57
5.12
5.95
7.98
7.70
6.96
4.74
2.10
0.99
PRINCIPAL
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
TOTAL
18.64
22.21
21.20
16.57
15.12
15.95
17.98
17.70
16.96
14.74
12.10
10.99
TOTAL
1972$
18.64
20.03
15.42
10.92
9.00
8.63
9.04
7.82
6.34
4.85
3.50
2.80
TABLE B
OPTION III: FIXED PAYMENTS, VARIABLE MATURITY
YEARS INT. PRINCIPAL
RATE AT BEG.OF
PERIOD
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
7.2
11.1
11.2
7.3
6.4
8.5
13.3
15.4
17.4
15.8
10.5
9.9
120.00
112.64
109.14
105.37
97.06
87.27
78.69
73.15
68.42
64.33
58.49
48.63
--------- PAYMENTS---------
INT. PRINCIPAL TOTAL
8.64
12.50
12.22
7.69
6.21
7.42
10.47
11.27
11.91
10.16
6.14
4.81
7.36
3.50
3.78
8.31
9.79
8.58
5.53
4.73
4.09
5.84
9.86
11.19
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
37.44 Unamortized Principal
TOTAL
1972$
16.00
14.43
11.64
10.55
9.52
8.66
8.04
7.07
5.98
5.26
4.63
4.07
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TABLE C
DUAL RATE VARIABLE RATE LOAN
YEARS DF
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
7.2
11.1
11.2
7.3
6.4
8.5
13.3
15.4
17.4
15.8
10.5
9.9
PF PRINCIPAL
AT BEG.OF
PERIOD
6.0
7.4
8.1
8.1
7.3
8.0
9.0
10.2
11.5
14.3
10.6
10.6
120.00
114.33
111.47
107.26
97.85
87.60
78.22
71.19
63.27
53.67
38.92
20.40
INT.
8.64
12.69
12.48
7.82
6.26
7.45
10.40
10.96
11.01
8.48
4.08
2.02
-- PAYMENTS---------
PRINCIPAL
5.67
2.86
4.20
9.41
10.25
9.38
7.03
7.91
9.60
14.75
18.52
20.40
TOTAL
TOTAL 1972$
14.31
15.55
16.69
17.24
16.51
16.83
17.44
18.87
20.61
23.23
22.60
22.42
14.31
14.02
12.14
11.36
9.83
9.11
8.77
8.33
7.70
7.64
6.54
5.70
DF = Debit Factor
PF = Payment Factor
TABLE D
CONSTANT-PAYMENT-FACTOR VARIABLE RATE LOAN
YEARS DF
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
7.2
11.1
11.2
7.3
6.4
8.5
13.3
15.4
17.4
15.8
10.5
9.9
PF PRINCIPAL
AT BEG.OF
PERIOD
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
120.00
116.48
116.93
116.31
109.87
101.25
93.60
88.77
83.06
75.17
60.47
35.22
-------- PAYMENTS----------
INT.
8.64
12.94
13.10
8.49
7.03
8.61
12.45
13.67
14.45
11.88
6.35
3.49
PRINCIPAL
3.42
-0.34
0.61
8.45
8.62
7.64
4.83
5.71
7.89
14.69
25.25
35.22
TOTAL
TOTAL 1972$
12.06 12.06
12.60 11.36
13.71 9.97
14.94 9.85
15.65 9.32
16.25 8.79
17.28 8.69
19.38 8.56
22.35 8.36
26.57 8.73
31.60 9.14
38.71 9.84
DF = Debit Factor
PF = Payment Factor
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the preceding chapter, we attempted to determine if
cofinancing -- either as it is currently done or as it is
proposed -- indeed contributes to mitigating the growing
developing country debt problem. The analysis suggests that
cofinancing, even as proposed, fails to completely resolve the
two factors that we identified as contributing to the problem.
The factor that relates to the volatile loan repayment of
project loans is only partially resolved. One of the
financial instruments proposed by the World Bank, the
Contingent Liability (Option III) does reduce the annual debt
service repayments. However, although it reduces some of the
volatility created by the variance of LIBOR, it still does not
succeed in matching the debt service to the income stream.
We have proposed two additional financial instruments,
the Dual-Rate Variable Rate Loan and the Constant-Payment-
Factor Variable Rate Loan. These instruments illustrate how
creative financing can address the problem of the borrower
country's ability to bear the financial burden of loan
repayment.
Unfortunately, such financial instruments can only
partially alleviate the volatile loan repayment structures.
They represent an incomplete solution because they totally
ignore the other very important factor contributing to the
debt problem.
This factor -- that project financing is really lending
with full recourse to the borrower country -- is not at all
addressed. Both the World Bank and commercial bank components
of cofinanced project loans continue to be full-recourse
loans. The World Bank, as required by its Articles of
Agreement, receives an official guarantee. The commercial
bank, as it is accustomed to in lending for activities in
developing countries, also typically receives a guarantee,
either officially or effectively. The commercial lender is
probably more likely to receive an official guarantee as a
result of its collaboration with the World Bank in a
cofinancing arrangement than it would otherwise. This might
actually increase the incidence of full recourse lending in
developing countries, hence exacerbating the debt problem even
further!
This issue is difficult to resolve because it requires
looking beyond the financial arrangements of a cofinancing and
reassessing the boundaries of the World Bank's role. The
World Bank could intermediate between the borrower country and
the commercial lender over certain arrangements in the project
financing. On the one hand, it could encourage borrower
countries to implement certain arrangements, such as the type
of escrow account described in the previous chapter. It could
also take part in the enforcing of such contracts either
through the use of its "clout" with the borrower country or
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through more explicit means, such as variations on the
cross-default clause. On the other hand, it could encourage
commercial lenders to forego a government guarantee when
lending for cofinanced projects. After all, there are
advantages to an association with the World Bank, as well as
some assurance that World Bank-generated projects are somehow
less risky than projects not associated with this institution.
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